A b s f r m -Traditional security tools and infrasmcmres have proven l o be inadequate, inflexible, and difficult to apply in the incredibly large Internet of today. Existing security systems deal mainly with authentication and access control and are not suitable for the increasingly demanding trust requirements in today's oemork-based applications. I n this paper, a generalpurpose, application-independent Dynamic Dishibuted T N S~ 'Model (DDTW that is suitable for access cootrol in the Internet applications is proposed. The core of this model i5 the recommendation m s t model organized as a Trust Delegation tree and authorization delegation realized by a delegation Certificate. DDTM provides a distributed key-oriented ccrtificate issuing mechanism with no ceotralhcd global authority. The service nuthorities can create their own t N S t policy and control access to the services owned by them. l o this paper, we first point out the insufficiency of the existing access control mechanisms and review several method for expressing mst We then propose the dynamic distributed trust model that worb over the Internet Finally, we focus on the detnil operations of Trust Delegation Tree.
I.WROOCCTION
Internet services are increasingly being used in daily life for clcctronic commerce, web-based access information, digital content distribution etc. The existing authorizanon systems such as ACL (Access Control List), however, mainly deal with authenticaoon and access control and are not scalable and suitable for the increasing nust requirements in today's network-based applications. Generally, security is implemented with the goal of establishing complete cemnty. In simple terms, this means either to accept or to reject a request for some operation by granting or restricting access to resources by combining authentication and access control. In this case, the resource owner, after identifying the requestor, checks an internal database to decide whether to allow the requestor to perform the requested action. This traditional secunty mechanism is not an acceptable approach for dynamic, heterogeneous and distributed network-based applicafions for the following reasons:
In such a distributed system, a huge set of entities cannot be known in advance. Authentication alone is sometimes not enough to make one confident about allowing a requested express trust relations in dishibuted networks by managing certification of identities, which is only a partial role of total trust management. In X.509, certificate authorities are maintained in a top-down hierarchy, and only the bottom level certificate authorities issue cetdficates I O users. This predefined hierarchy is not scalable and efficient for expressing the tlust relations. Trust in PGP is achieved using the web of trust model that breaks the hierarchical trust architecture and has no centralized authority that everyone husts. However, the lack of fmed or formal certification paths in PGP creates anarchy. Both X.509 and PGP do not explicitly support delegation. SPKI [4] and PolicyMaker [l] aim for decentralization of authority and management operations.
However, the processing of certificates in SPKI may be done in an applicationdependent method, and PolicyMaker requires complex programming. We propose a dynamic distributed trust model that provides a flexible mechanism for delegation of trust and continuous monitoring of the changes to the level of m s t of each node. It has the advantage of decentralized hierarchical administration, scalability of certificate issuing capacity and the flexibility of delegation.
In the following sections, dynamic distributed bust model will be explained in the context of digital content distribution.
THE OVERVIEW OF DDTM
As the possibility of doing business or sharing resources over the Internet is dramatically increased, the notion of trust management in electronic communities has become an imporlant research issue.
--S i c e the Internet services are not limited to a specific range of domains and organizations, a distributed, flexible and general-purpose trust management is necessary. The dynamic distributed trust model (DDTM) is a model for establishing a trust relationship between entities that may never meet with each other to provide a scalable, decentralized access-control mechanism over the Internet.
The objectives of DDTM are to:
1)
Decentralize the trust management from a resource authority by delegating the certificate issuing capability in a hierarchical rn structure.
2)
Establish a Dynamic Distributed Trust Model (DDTM) to be reliable for issuing certificate, scalable for handing a large amount of requestors, and flexible for providing general trust relationship evaluation.
DDTM provides a distributed key-oriented certificate issuing mechanism with no centralized global authority. DDTM builds a hierarchical tree structure underneath an authorized mot, and delegates the certificate issuing authority to the nodes on the tree. The tree is dynamically updated to reflect the trust relationship between the nodes on the tree in real time interaction. Any node on the tree may be able to delegate the certificate issuing capability to any others it busts and to add them as its children on the tree. Whenever any node or even the authorized root is broken or disabled, it will not affect any other node on the tree from working properly. The authorization certificate is used in DDTM to delegate the certificate issuing capability.
The local service authority can create its own trust policy and control access to the services owned by it. Therefore, DDTM provides a separate trust management h e w o r k from applications.
Before DDTM is described i n . detail, its specific components are described here to provide an overview.
Content owner:
This is a local service authority. In specific, it holds the master copy of the content. It can delegate certificate issuing authority to the root it directly trusts or other nodes on the tree it indirectly trusts.
Reperfor: This is the user who wants to utilize certain content. It can access the content by obtaining signed certificates to demonstrate that it is trustwoahy. CertJ?cute issuers: These are the trusted intermediaries for a content owner and organized in a hierarchical tree topology called Trust Delegation Tree (TDT). Every node on this tree is able to sign a certificate for a requestor so that every node on TDT is a certificate issuer. The highest authorization level is at the root. A node on TDT also can be a requestor. The basic idea of this model is that a requestor submits its request for content that is signed by its private key to a content owner. The content owner gives the information of whether the content is available and who is the authorized root to the requestor. The requestor needs to get a proper certificate signed by certificate issuers and submit it to the content owner. The "proper" means the certificate can prove the requestor has enough k u s t value to be granted the request by the content owner.
DDTM is not concerned with how a content owner delivers the content. Rather, it mainly focuses on providing a generalpurpose, application-independent model that is suitable for access control for Internet applications. The above diagram can be simplified in Figure 2 by assuming that a requestor can communicate with a content owner directly and ignoring the content delivery mechanism.
The Internet

STRUCTURE OF TRUST DELEGATION TREE (TDT)
Trust Delegation Tree (Figure 3 ) is proposed in this paper to represent the level of authorized certificate iswing capacity on behalf of a certain content owner. Central to TDT is to distribute certificateissuing capacity and manage certificateissuing nodes in a tree structure to avoid random distribution.
A. Concept of Trust Delegation Tree
Before the detailed description of TDT, several definitions need to be given here.
Authorized Root: The root is authorized by a content owner, and is on behalf of and identified by the content owner. It could he any entity the content owner knows about and trusts on to take care of the certificate-issuing matter for the content owner.
Certificate-issuing Nodes: These are the nodes on the Trust Delegation Tree to be used as the trusted intermediaries by a content owner. There is no centralized management for all the nodes on TDT. Every node manages its own children and is managed by its parent.
Authorization Level: It is also the recommendation trust value that represents a content owner's belief in the recommendation. The authorization level of a node decreases, as it gets farther away from the rmt of TDT.
A content owner directly authorizes the root of TDT, and every node on TDT may authorize other entities to be its children. As soon as TDT is established, the nodes on TDT could issue certificates to requestors to provide more confidence about unlmown or less known requestors to a content owner. Every node could have its own policy to decide how much it trusts another entity.
TDT is not a fixed topology. It keeps growing as more nodes on TDT delegate certificate-issuing capacity to other entities. A node can dynamically increase its authorization level by introducing more trusted requestors or by having more successful transactions directly with a content owner. On the other han& a node can be dynamically degraded or removed if it engages in unsuccessful transactions, or by introducing malicious requestors.
The TDT is the topology for representing distributed and dynamic authorization capacity. Since the trust relationship between a content owner and a less known requestor is either established through the root or through any node on the tree, TDT provides a strong certificate chain to introduce a less knom requestor to the content owner. The root gains the highest level of trust from the content owner, and each level of nodes on TDT under the root has a gradually decreased ~(0,1) , n is the level ofthe node on TDT A content owner gives the authorization level x, to a root due to its subjective trust evaluation of the root. Following the content owner, each higher-level node assigns authorization level A', to its trusted children.
B. Operations of T y s t Delegation Tree 1) Initialization Operations
The initialization operations are aimed at generating the Trust Delegation Tree. Every parent node on the TDT must have a very strong trust relationship with its children. We defme the quantified direct trust value would be in the range of 0 to 1. For example, a node can specify a 0.9 trust value threshold for entities that wish to be its children. The trust value threshold could be defined by a content owner or by the node itself depending on whether the content owner passes this attribute over the TDT. The TDT is started from the root that a content owner authorizes. The root would check with its history record, and contact every entity it trusts to let it to be its child. The same algorithm will apply to every entity that has become a node of TDT. When the TDT is built, every node has the information about its parent, children, siblings and the certificate chain from the root to itself. Parameters such as refresh interval, trust value threshold to become a child etc., may be passed from the content owner to the root and from there to every node on the TDT. The root periodically refreshes the content owner with the status of its child nodes. Figure 4 shows how the content owner chooses the root and how the root connects to its children. 
2) Validation Operations
The consistency operations are intended to keep a content owner aware of whether the root is alive and the delegation certificate of each node is valid. If a content owner does not receive refresh messages from the root within the specified timeout period, the content owner will choose one of the root's children to be the new root. For each node of TDT, it needs to obtain a new delegation certificate before the old one expires. As shown in Figure 5 , the root sends refresh messages to the content owner and its children periodically. 
3) Reliability Operations
The purpose of the reliability operations on TDT is to ensure that any crashed node will not affect the workability of the other nodes. The reliability operations for a root and a node are handled separately. If the root crashes, the content owner will appoint one of the crashed root's children to be the new root, and the other children of the original root are shifted under the new root. If a node crashes, all its children will be added below one of the crashed node's siblings. Figure 6 shows how to handle the situations when the root or a node crashes.
Figurc 6: oprratians for -lacing L e mt or a parent 4) Re-organization operations TDT represents the trust relationship and authorization hierarcby of a content owner. The trust level of a node on TDT is periodically re-evaluated by the content owner based on the quality of the node's recommendation of other requestors, or the direct transactions with the content owner. Therefore, the node and its sub-tree could be upgraded, downgraded or totally removed. These operations are shown in Figure 7 . 
IV. CONCLUSION
As more content and software resources have been distributed on the Internet, the centralized access control infrastructures have proven inadequate with respect to scalability and flexibility. We have introduced a dynamic distributed trust model that addresses the above concerns by providing a distributed key-oriented certificate issuing mechanism with no centralized global authority. By utilization of the Trust Delegation Tree and delegation certificate chain, the model can be used to provide scalable and fault tolerant infiastruchue for granting access to contents in the Internet. Future work includes methods for certificate revocation and definition of a policy language.
